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ABSTRACT
The Nigerian Federal Government in 2010 made a regulatory interven-tion in the Nigerian oil and gas industry by enacting the Nigerian Oil 
and Gas Industry Content Development Act (The “Act”). The Act prescribes 
in sections 10 and 12 that preference should be given to ‘...goods manufac-
tured in Nigeria’. This paper considers the legal standing of these sections 
in international trade law against the backdrop of the national treatment 
principle contained in Article III of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). A comparative analysis is made using Article III to establish that the 
two sections flagrantly violate the obligations of the Nigerian state as a mem-
ber of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and GATT. An unexplored con-
tract alternative to legislation argument is then advanced and recommended.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In spite of the huge oil reserves in Nigeria and the boundless potentials that come with it, the country continues to be plagued by unemployment 
and low capacity in the oil and gas industry. The Nigerian Federal Executive 
Council have pointed out repeatedly that the problem can be remedied by 
having a local content enactment to ensure greater participation by Nigeri-
ans. This, it was felt will create jobs and build capacity in the industry. The 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development Act1 was signed into law in the 
year 2010. The Act requires that preference and priority should be given to 
Nigerians and Nigerian products.2 This move has stirred up questions on 
whether the provisions of the Act violate the non-discrimination principles 
* Adewale Aladejare, LL.M (UK), LL.B (Ife) is a lecturer at the College of Law, Afe Babalola 
University, Ado Ekiti.
1 The Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development Act, Chapter P10 Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria (LFN) 2004.
2 ibid ss 10 and 12.
Aladejare: Legal Status of Sections 10 and 12 of The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act
130          AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY: JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW AND POLICY VOL. 5 ISS. 1 (2015)
under the GATT regime. This paper attempts to make a contribution to this 
debate. In doing so, the paper examines whether local content principles 
potentially conflict with Nigeria’s obligations as a member of GATT and the 
WTO to eliminate barriers to trade and to promote the non-discrimination 
principles. 
The Act was a product of so many years of consultation and debate.3 
This was as a result of the feeling, over the years that the Nigerian economy 
has not received a fair benefit from the oil and gas industry.4 It is a notori-
ous fact that the oil industry is the backbone of the Nigerian economy with 
the government deriving over 80 per cent of its revenue from this sector. 
It also accounts for over 70 per cent of Nigeria’s export.5 Such is the im-
portance of the industry. Observably, in spite of all these, unemployment 
rate continues to increase. Successive governments have pointed out that 
securing a greater participation for Nigerians, Nigerian companies and Ni-
gerian products is the way forward for the economy. It has been argued that 
building local capacity as well as securing technology transfer will have a 
ripple effect on the economy and ultimately ensure greater economic ben-
efits for Nigerians.
There is, on the other hand, the obligation of the Nigerian nation as a 
member of the WTO and GATT.6 The obligation is such that Nigeria, as a 
member state, should ensure that protectionist policies, laws and regulations 
are avoided to make for trade liberalisation. This principle of non-discrimi-
nation forms the bedrock of the WTO and GATT.7 Under the GATT regime, 
the non-discrimination principle can be further broken down into two: the 
most-favoured nation treatment and the national treatment principles.
The most-favoured nation treatment obligation contained in Article I:1 
of GATT prohibits any form of discrimination between ‘like’ products orig-
inating from or going to other countries.8 The purpose is to ensure trade 
3. See for example A Adefulu, “Nigeria: National Treatment & Nigeria’s New Local Content 
Legislation” (2010) < http://www.mondaq.com/Nigeria/x/102400/international+trade+in-
vestment/National+Treatment+Nigerias+New+Local+Content+Legislation> accessed June 
23, 2015.
3 G Etikerense, Nigerian Petroleum Law (2nd edn, Macmillan 2004) 221.
4 E. Nwaokoro, ‘Signed, sealed but will it deliver? Nigeria’s local content bill and cross-sec-
toral growth’ [2011] Journal of World Energy Law and Business 2.
5 National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Review of the Nigerian Economy in 2011 & Economic Out-
look for 2012-2015’ (May 2012) <www.nigerianstat.gov.ng> accessed 11 July 2012.
6 Nigeria became a member of the WTO on the 1st of January 1995 and a member of GATT 
on the 18th November 1960.
7 Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases 
and Materials (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2005) 308.
8 Canada - Autos (19 June 2000) WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R Appellate Body Re-
port [84].
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liberalization and free flow of imports and exports within member states. 
In essence, where an import from country A comes into country B, it must 
receive a treatment not less favourable than that accorded to an import from 
country C coming into country B provided the products can be regarded as 
like products. Furthermore, the national treatment principle9 is relevant to 
market access under GATT and WTO.10 As far as goods and products are 
concerned, the principle is to the effect that once products are imported 
and all the necessary and applicable border measures such as custom du-
ties and tariffs have been charged and collected, they must be accorded the 
same treatment as ‘like’11 domestic products, or at least treatment not less 
favourable to like domestic products. Hence, no internal tax, levies, policies 
or other forms of regulatory measures and interventions, which will have 
the effect of limiting the sale, use or transportation of such products should 
be applied. Protectionist policies, which influence competition conditions 
between imported products and ‘like’ domestic ones should not be allowed. 
The effect of Article III is to limit the protective measures of member states 
to border control in the form of tariffs.12 Goods that have crossed the border 
and fulfilled all border measures should be treated as domestic for all intent 
and purposes.
Sections 10 and 12 of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content De-
velopment Act places an express prohibition on the use of imported goods 
in the Nigerian oil and gas industry where like domestic products are avail-
able. They attempt to protect the local manufacturing industry in this sector 
with this enactment, which compels operators in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry to procure materials locally if and where such is available. Prima 
facie, this is in contravention of the national treatment principle contained 
in Article III of GATT. 
This paper attempts a comparative analysis of Article III and sections 
10 and 12 with particular focus on the three tier tests for ascertaining the 
circumstances in which there will be a violation of Article III.
9 General Agreement on Trade in Services (April 15 1994) Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organisation ‘GATT 1994’,  Article III.
10 M Mitsushita et al, The World Trade Organisation Law, Practice and Policy (2nd edn, 
Oxford 2006) 234.
11 The meaning of ‘like product’ is examined closely later as it is a recurring phrase in this 
paper.
12 Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery 23 Oct. 1958, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (7th SUPP 1959) 60, para 12.
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2. SECTIONS 10 AND 12 OF THE NIGERIAN OIL AND 
GAS INDUSTRY CONTENT DEVELOPMENT ACT 
(2010) AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRINCIPLES
The Act was established to integrate local participation and representa-tion in oil and gas investments and activities in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry.13 It entrenched a regulatory framework for the participation of Ni-
gerians, Nigerian companies14 and Nigerian products in project investments 
and activities. A key requirement of the Act is that operators are to submit 
a Nigerian Content Plan when bidding for any permit or licence and also 
before embarking on any project.15 It is only after this plan has been certified 
to be in compliance with the Act that a ‘Certificate of Authorization’ will 
be issued.16 The Nigerian Content Plan should be drawn in such a way as 
to ensure that: 
a) first consideration shall be given to services provided from within 
Nigeria and goods manufactured in Nigeria; and
b) Nigerians shall be given first consideration for training and em-
ployment in the work programme for which the plan was submit-
ted.17
The implication of the Nigerian content plan in section 10 is that 
where there are domestic products and equipment to be used, they should 
be given priority over and above ‘like’ products and equipment that have 
been imported. For operators not to err against section 10 (1)(a), they 
have to accord a less-favourable treatment to ‘like’ imported products in 
their operations in this regard. Furthermore, section 12 goes on to impose 
another obligation on the operators and their contractors. It provides as 
follows:
13 The preamble of the Act provides that it is ‘for the development of Nigerian Content in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry; for Nigerian Content Plan; for supervision, coordination, 
monitoring and implementation of Nigerian content and for matters incidental thereto’.
14 ‘Nigerian company’ is defined to mean companies incorporated in Nigeria under the Com-
panies and Allied matters Act, Chapter 59, LFN 1990. Also, Nigerians must hold at least 
51 per cent equity in such companies.
15 Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010,  s 7.
16 ibid s 8.
17 ibid s10.
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Subject to section 7 of this Act, the Nigerian Content Plan sub-
mitted to the board by an operator shall contain a detailed plan, 
satisfactory to the board, setting out how the operators and their 
contractors will give first consideration to Nigerian goods and ser-
vices, including specific examples showing how first consideration 
is considered and assessed by the operator in its evaluation of bids 
for goods and services required by the project.18
Under this provision, operators are not just compelled to apply the 
provisions of the Act, they are also required to hold their contractors to 
the same standard and give a convincing explanation on how the Nigerian 
content plan has been implemented. Whatever procurement is to be made 
must be in conformity with this provision. With emphasis on ‘...first consid-
eration to Nigerian goods’, like imported goods which have passed all the 
border measures at the port of entry will invariably be placed at a compet-
itive disadvantage.
The Principle of Non-Discrimination
The non-discrimination principle is cardinal in the laws and policies of the WTO.19 According to the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement, 
‘the elimination of discriminatory treatment’ is a key goal of the WTO.20 
The term ‘discrimination’ is very slippery. Care has to be taken so as not to 
attribute to it a meaning not intended in the context in which it is used. This 
warning was issued succinctly when a panel report noted that: 
Discrimination is a term to be avoided whenever more precise stan-
dards are available, and when employed, it is a term to be interpret-
ed with caution, and with care to add no more precision than the 
concept contains.21 
18 ibid s12.
19 Van den Bossche (n 8) 308. See also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation, pmbl., cl. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144.
20 ibid.
21 Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (March 17, 2000) WT/DS114/R 
(panel report, adopted April 2000) 7.94. The report makes reference to the term ‘discrimi-
nation’ in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS.
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Under the WTO law, the principle of non-discrimination can be sub-di-
vided into two. They are: most favoured nation treatment obligation;22 and 
national treatment obligation.23
Most Favoured Nation Treatment
In discussing the most favoured nation treatment, it is expedient to lay 
out the provisions of Article I:1 of GATT. It goes thus:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on 
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on 
the international transfer of payment for imports or exports, and 
with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and 
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with impor-
tation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred in 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by any [Member] to any product originating 
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined 
for the territories of all other [Members].24
The most favoured nation treatment imposes an obligation on member 
states not to discriminate between products coming from or going to other 
member states. As it is, the essence of the Most Favoured Nation treatment 
is to guarantee ‘equality of opportunity’ in import and export to and from 
all WTO member states.25 A measure which prima facie is non discriminato-
ry may in fact have an effect of discrimination on its application.26 
In determining whether there has been a violation of the Most Favoured 
Nation treatment contained in Article I, a measure must be subjected to a 
three-tier test. They are as follows:
22 Article I of the GATT 1994.
23 Article III of the GATT 1994.
24 ibid.
25 EC - Bananas III (Article 21: 5) Appellate Body Report, [190].
26 Canada – Autos (n 9) [78]. In this case, Canada had argued that Article I should not be 
applicable in circumstances where the measure complained of appear to be ‘origin-neutral’ 
on the face of it. This argument was rejected as such measures could have the effect of giv-
ing some countries greater trading opportunities than others. That, in itself was said to be 
discriminatory.
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1) Does the measure give a trade advantage?
2) Are the products concerned like products? 
3) Is the conferred advantage given immediately and unconditionally 
to all concerned like  products?
In determining whether an advantage has been conferred, one must 
hold in mind that conferring an advantage is not limited to tariffs. Article 
I:1 makes a list of measures through which an advantage can be bestowed 
on products originating from a country. They include:
(a) Custom duties and charges of any kind imposed in connection with 
importation and exportation.
(b) Method of levying the tariffs and the charge.
(c) The rules and formalities in connection with importation and ex-
portation.
(d) nternal taxes and charges on imported goods.
(e) Internal laws, regulations and requirements affecting sale.27 
In Canada - Autos, Canada gave import duty exemptions to car manu-
factures that carried out their production inside Canada. It was held by the 
Appellate Body that this constituted an ‘advantage’ and must be granted to 
others immediately and unconditionally.28 Again, there has to be a deter-
mination on whether the imported and domestic products are ‘like’. Only 
products found to be ‘like’ will be accorded the same treatment.29 Advantag-
es granted to a member state by another must be granted immediately and 
unconditionally to other member states.30
The National Treatment Principle
The aim of the national treatment principle is to legally secure the expec-
tations of member countries of the WTO and GATT in international trade 
law with regards to imported products vis-a-vis their domestic counter-
parts. It is to ensure that products of an exporting member have a chance to 
27 Article I:1, GATT 1994.
28 Canada - Autos (n 9) [79].
29 The phrase ‘like products’ is discussed under Article III where it is shown that the phrase 
takes its interpretation from the context in which it is used. It was used severally in the 
GATT text but GATT never defined what constituted ‘like product’. 
30 Indonesia – Autos, Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Panel report, ad-
opted 23 July 1998) WT/DS54/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS6 4/R [14.145] – [14.146].
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compete with domestic products of an importing member country.31 With 
these, there is greater certainty and predictability in international trade.32 
Member states have an obligation under Article II on tariff binding.33 If 
national treatment is not adhered to, then it will be possible to circumvent 
Article II.34 In Korea-Beef,35 it was up for consideration whether Korea was 
in breach of Article III by maintaining a ‘dual retail system’ in the sale of 
beef. The system limited the sale of imported beef to certain stores. Also, 
imported beefs were to be displayed in a separate section and must be la-
belled as such. The Appellate body was of the opinion that mere separation 
does not amount to a violation of Article III.36 However, the ‘effect’37 was 
to reduce the outlet for imported beef when compared to domestic beef. 
Thus, the ‘reduction in competitive opportunity’38 amounted to a violation 
of Article III:4 of GATT.
3. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE III OF GATT
The national treatment principles contained in Article III stipulates that member countries of the WTO accord national treatment to one anoth-
er. The use of internal taxes, charges, laws and regulations, which tend to 
discriminate against imported goods for the purpose of protecting domes-
tic products or production is prohibited. In essence, once tariffs have been 
charged on imports, they should not be given a less favourable treatment to 
similar domestic products. At this point, it is expedient to lay out the rele-
vant provisions of Article III:
1) The [Members] recognize that internal taxes and other internal 
charges, laws, regulations and requirements affecting the inter-
nal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution 
or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring 
31 J.H Snelson, ‘Can GATT Article III Recover From Its Head-on Collision With United States 
- Taxes on Automobiles?’ (1996) 5 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade  467.
32 United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported substances, 17 June, 1987, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (1988, 34th Supp) 136 [5.2.2].
33 Article II of GATT 1994.
34 Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery (n 13).
35 Korea – beef, Various Measures Affecting Import of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Appel-
late Body Report, adopted 10 January 2001) WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R [133].
36 ibid [144].
37 The ‘aim and effect test’ is examined later in this paper. It works to the effect that in order 
to determine whether an internal measure is discriminatory, one has to look at the aim of 
the measure and the actual effect it has.
38 Korea – Beef (n 36) [147] – [148].
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the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or 
proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic prod-
ucts so as to afford protection to domestic production.
2) The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into 
the territory of any other [Member] shall not be subject, directly 
or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any 
kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like do-
mestic products. Moreover, no [Member] shall otherwise apply 
internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domes-
tic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in 
paragraph 1… 
4) The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into the 
territory of any other member shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin 
in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribu-
tion or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the 
application of differential internal transportation charges which 
are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of 
transport and not on the nationality of the product.39
From the forgoing, one can safely say that the imposition of an addi-
tional tax or charge, which is exclusive to an imported product, is inconsis-
tent with the provisions of Article III. Also, any law or regulation that tends 
to give a preferential treatment to local products disregards and violates the 
national treatment principle.
Article III:1
This provision lays the foundation for the national treatment principle under the GATT regime. It prohibits the use of internal measures as a means of 
protecting domestic production. The Appellate Body in Japan - Alcoholic Bev-
erages II reemphasised the importance of Article III:1 as “a guide to understand-
ing and interpreting the specific obligations contained in Article III:2 and in 
other paragraphs of Article III while respecting and not diminishing in any way, 
the meaning of the words actually used in the text of those other paragraphs”.40 
39 Article III, GATT 1994.
40 Japan - Alcoholic Beverages (Appellate Body Report, adopted 1 November 1996) WT/DS8/
AB/R 18.
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Article III:1 is the foundation upon which the subsequent paragraphs in the 
Article are built as it provides the base principle.
Textual Analysis of Article III:2: 
First Sentence
Article III:2 is limited in application to the use of ‘internal tax or other internal charge of any kind’.41 In Argentina - Hides and Leathers,42 
the Appellate Body posited that it is not necessary under Article III:2 to 
show that the internal taxation was for the purpose of protecting domestic 
production. This is because Article III:2 is an application of the anti-pro-
tectionist principle contained in Article III:1. In order to determine whether 
there has been a violation of Article III:2, a two-tier test has to be cleared. 
The questions to be answered will then be; can we classify the imported and 
domestic products as ‘like’ products? In addition, are the imported products 
taxed in excess of their domestic counterparts?
The GATT regime has no clear definition of the phrase ‘like products’. 
Neither does it stipulate the characteristics that should constitute likeness. 
Over the years however, recourse has been made to reports emanating from 
dispute settlements within the GATT. In Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, it 
was up for consideration whether ‘vodka’ and ‘shochu’ could be termed 
like products. The Appellate Body opted for a narrow construction of the 
phrase.43 Perhaps, a case by case approach should be adopted.44 This, it is 
said, involves in a large part, discretion and judgement in individual case.45 
Back to the vodka/shochu comparison, the Appellate Body held the two to 
be like products on the reasoning that they were both ‘clean spirits’ and they 
share identical raw material with the same end use.46
On the second question of the excessiveness of the tax imposed on the 
imported product, it has been established that ‘[e]ven the smallest amount in 
excess is too much’.47 Where the United States levied a tax which impose 3.5 
41 The first sentence of Article III:2, GATT 1994.
42 Argentina - Hides and Leather, Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and Import 
of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R and Corr.1 (panel report, adopted 16 Feb. 2001); See 
also Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II (n 41) [18] – [19].
43 See Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II (n 41) 18, 19.
44 Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments [18]; See also, Japan - Alcoholic 
Beverages II (n 41) [19] – [20].
45 ibid.
46 ibid  [6.23].
47 Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II (n 41) 23.
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cent per barrel higher than that which was imposed on like domestic prod-
ucts, it was held to be in violation of the country’s obligations under Article 
III:2 of GATT.48 Also, a form of tax which on the surface does not appear 
to be discriminatory but on a closer look gives a competitive advantage to a 
like domestic product also violates Article III:2.49
Second Sentence
The second sentence of Article III:2 contemplates a broader coverage than the first sentence.50 It will only be resorted to in a circumstance 
where the measure does not violate the first sentence of Article III:1.51 De-
termining violation of the ‘second sentence’ is through a three tier test.52 The 
questions to be answered will be:
a) Are the imported and domestic products directly competitive or 
substitutable products?
b) Are the imported and domestic products similarly taxed?
c) Is the dissimilar taxation for the purpose of protecting domestic 
production?53
Obviously, the concept of ‘directly competitive or substitutable prod-
ucts’ under the second sentence of Article III:2 is broader than that of ‘like 
products’ under the first sentence. Products might be considered to be ‘di-
rectly competitive and substitutable’ if they can be used interchangeably or 
where they provide alternative means of meeting a need.54 They don’t have 
to be perfectly substitutable. This is in the same way consumer demand will 
48 US Superfund, United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Products (Panel 
report, adopted 17 June 1987)  BISD 34S/136 [5.1.1].
49 Argentina - Hides and Leather (n 43) [11.183]. The Report noted that “...were it otherwise, 
Members may easily evade its disciplines. Thus, even where imported and like domestic 
product are subject to identical tax rates, the actual tax burden can still be heavier on im-
ported products. This could be the case, for instance, where different methods of computing 
tax bases lead to a greater actual tax burden for imported products “. In essence, where the 
economic impact of a tax levied puts an imported product at a competitive disadvantage, it 
will be discriminatory.
50 E. Tsai, ‘Like is a four - Letter Wort - GATT Article III’s Like Product Conundrum’ (1999) 
17 Berkeley Journal of  International  Law 27.
51 Canada - Periodicals, Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Appellate Body 
Report, adopted 30 July 1997) WT/DS31/AB/R  22, 23.
52 Chile - Alcoholic Beverages (2000) Appellate Body Report [47]; See also Japan - Alcoholic 
Beverages II (n 41) 24;  H Horn, ‘Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of 
National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case - Law on Tax Discrimination’ (2004) 15 (1) 
European Journal of International Law, 39-69.
53 Canada – Periodicals (n 52) 24, 25.
54 Korea - Alcoholic Beverages (1999) [120].
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be relevant since internal taxation could affect consumer demand for a prod-
uct.55 For the second sentence to be violated, the taxes imposed on imported 
products and like domestic products must be dissimilar. However, quite un-
like the first sentence where the slightest difference in the tax imposed would 
make for a finding of inconsistency, it is not so with the second sentence.
Article III:4
Article III:4 represents the crux of this paper as it deals with internal regulations which are discriminatory against imported products.56 The 
Article stipulates that imported products will not be accorded treatment 
which is less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products. It 
goes ahead to enumerate the form of treatment to include treatment by 
laws, regulations and any other requirement which affects distribution or 
use, transportation, purchase, internal sale and offering for sale of the prod-
uct. For there to be a finding of violation of Article III:4, three questions 
must be answered in the affirmative.57 
1) Is the measure a law, regulation or requirement contemplated by 
Article III:4?
2) Are the import and domestic products ‘like’?
3) Are the imported products accorded a less favourable treatment?
Even though Article III:4 did not make any reference to Article III:1 
as regards ‘so as to afford protection to domestic production’,58 Article 
III:1 has a ‘particular contextual significance in interpreting Article III:4’.59 
Even though the view that Article III:4 does not require an examination of 
whether the measure was for the purpose of affording protection to domes-
tic product has been advanced.60 Here, there are two conflicting views and 
the position or this writer is that it will be safer to advance the view that 
55 This might not be a decisive criterion for determining ‘directly competitive or substitutable’. 
See Korea - Alcoholic Beverages (n 55) [134].
56 The objective of this paper is to see if sections 10 and 12 of the Nigerian Oil and Gas In-
dustry Content Development Act violate the National Treatment principle in Article III of 
GATT. The Act does not impose taxes in excess of those imposed on like domestic products 
but stipulates that preference should be given to products manufactured in Nigeria. Article 
III:4 is directly relevant in this regard as opposed to Article III:2.
57 Korea – beef (n 36) [133].
58 EC - Bananas III (n 26) [216].
59 EC - Asbestos, EC - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (Ap-
pellate Body Report, adopted 5 April 2001)WT/DS135/AB/R, DSR 2001 VII3243 [93]
60 See EC - Bananas III (n 26) [216].
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Article III:1, being the general principle, should be applicable throughout 
Article III. Now the three elements will be examined closely.
3.1 Laws, Regulations and Requirements
Establishing this element requires a clear and straightforward analysis. It will appear that the scope of Article III:4 covers all laws and regula-
tions which will have an impact on the sale and use of imported products. 
GATT case law offers some guidance in assessing this element. Now, the 
term ‘affecting’ as used in the text of Article III:4 was interpreted in Italian 
Agricultural Machinery to mean not just laws and regulations that directly 
affect the use and sale of imported products but also any law or regulation 
affecting the conditions under which the imported product competes with 
‘like’ domestic products.61
Similarly, the term ‘laws and regulations’ does not just cover substantive 
laws but also procedural laws.62 If the contrary were to hold true, then it 
will be conceivable that members have substantive laws which comply with 
Article III:4 in letter but violate it in its application procedures.63 Laws and 
regulations will ‘affect’ the sale and use of imported products if they will 
influence private persons’ decision on whether or not imported products 
should be bought or used.64 ‘Requirements’ under Article III:4 covers situa-
tions and circumstances where the measure at issue was imposed by private 
persons rather than government. This is however beyond the scope of this 
paper.
3.2 Are the Domestic and Imported Products ‘Like’?
The phrase ‘like products’ is somewhat ambiguous in the jurisprudence of GATT.65 It will be recalled that this has been discussed earlier under 
Article III:2. Fundamental to the analysis what constitutes ‘like products’ is 
61 Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery (n 13) [12].
62 US - Section 337, United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Panel Report, ad-
opted 7 November 1989) BISD 36S/345 [5.10].
63 See US - Malt Beverages (1992) Panel Report [5.32] where a law requiring imported beer 
and wine to be sold only through certain wholesalers was held to violate Article III:4. See 
also Canada - Provincial Liquor Boards (US), Canada - Import, Distribution and Sale of 
Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies (Panel Report, adopted 18 
February 1992) BISD 39S/27  [4.26].
64 Canada – Autos (n 9) [10.80], [10.84].
65 R. Hudec, Regulatory Barriers and The Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade 
Law (University of Michigan Press 2000) 1.
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the case of EC-Asbestos.66 In this case, it was up for consideration whether 
chrysotile asbestos fibre is ‘like’ glass fibre and poyvinyl alcohol. The panel 
sitting at first instance had found the two products to be ‘like’ and the mea-
sure at issue a violation of Article III:4 after considering:
1) the properties, quality and nature of the products,
2) consumers’ habits and taste,
3) the end-uses of the products and
4) the tariff classification.67
The European Community contended on appeal to the Appellate Body 
that the panel did not take into account the aim and purpose of Article III:4 
in reaching its conclusion. The Appellate Body posited that since the GATT 
did not prescribe what interpretation should be ascribed to the phrase ‘like 
products’, it should be interpreted to give effect to the purpose and objective 
in the context in which it is used. Hence, we cannot have a single standard for 
determining what constitutes ‘like products’ which will be applicable in every 
situation and circumstance. ‘Like products’ under Article III:4 will have to be 
interpreted with due regard to the aim and objective of the Article which is to 
ensure that competition conditions are not distorted ‘so as to afford protection 
to domestic production’. On the strength of these, there will be a variation 
in the interpretations given to ‘like products’ in different Articles. A broader 
meaning will be accorded to the phrase under Article III:4.68 In determining 
what constitutes ‘like products’ under Article III:4, the general principle of the 
whole Article III must be held in mind and it is that the conditions of competi-
tion must not be distorted ‘so as to afford protection to domestic production’.69
3.3 Was the Treatment Less Favourable? 
There has to be an ‘effective equality of competitive opportunities’.70 Where a measure allows the sellers of domestic gasoline to use a baseline different 
from that to be used by sellers of imported gasoline, this was found to consti-
tute a less favourable treatment.71 Also, in Korea-Beef, a system that ensured 
66 Appellate Body Report, EC - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Prod-
ucts, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001: VII, 3243.
67 Japan - Alcoholic Beverages (n 41) 20.
68 EC – Asbestos (n 60)  [94] – [96].
69 ibid [98].
70 Canada - Provincial Liquor Boards (US) (n 64) [5.12] – [5.14], [5.30] – [5.31].
71 US – Gasoline Panel Report (May 20, 1996), 35 ILM 274.
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that imported beef was displayed separately in supermarkets and labelled as 
such was held to be a less favourable treatment.72 Since the objective of Article 
III is ‘not to accord protection to domestic production’, one can say any dif-
ferent treatment for imported products, which tend to hamper the chances of 
the imported product to compete with its domestic counterpart will amount to 
a less favourable treatment. Any regulatory intervention that tilts the playing 
field in favour of the domestic product for the purpose of protecting domestic 
production will be inconsistent with the obligations under Article III.
4. THE LEGAL STATUS OF SECTIONS 10 AND  
12 UNDER THE GATT REGIME
The provision of Section 10 requires that ‘first consideration shall be given ... to goods manufactured in Nigeria’. The effect of this Section 
is such that should there be a ‘like’ imported product in the circumstance, 
preference and priority should be given to the goods manufactured in Ni-
geria. This is regardless of whether the imported product in question has 
passed all the border measures in the form of tariff. It will be recollected that 
Article III:1 prohibits the discriminatory treatment of imported products 
which have passed all the border measures in the importing country.
Article III:4 Versus Sections 10 and 12
In determining whether there has been a violation of Article III:4, a three tier test was identified above. Now, the test will be applied to the rele-
vant provisions of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development 
Act to ascertain the provisions offend against Article III. It seems evident 
that since the Act does not impose an additional tax or charge on imported 
products in excess of that imposed on ‘like’ domestic products. In applying 
the three-tier test to Sections 10 and 12, three questions will be considered.
1) Is The Measure At Issue a Law, Regulation or a Requirement 
Affecting Internal Sale, Purchase and Use of Imported Products?
This seems to be the most straightforward of the three requirements to be met before there can be a finding of violation. To fall within the pur-
views of Article III:4, the measure at issue must pass as a law, regulation or 
72 Korea – Beef (n 36) [135] – [137].
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a requirement. The Blacks’ Law Dictionary defines law as ‘the regime that 
orders human activities and relations through systematic application of the 
force of politically organised society, or through social pressure, backed by 
force, in such a society...’73
The regime designed to shape human conduct, a derogation from which 
will be punished can be said to be law. For all intent and purpose, the Ni-
gerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act satisfies the require-
ments of a law and should be so categorised under the GATT regime. Also, 
its provisions, particularly Sections 10 and 12 affect the internal sale, offer-
ing for sale, purchase, transportation distribution or use of imported prod-
ucts in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. These two provisions will definitely 
influence the decisions of private persons on which products to purchase 
and use in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.74
Are The Imported and Domestic Products ‘Like’?
‘Like’ products under Article III:4 was given a succinct enunciation in EC - Asbestos. It was the Appellate Body’s position that the meaning 
ascribed to the phrase ‘like products’ under Article III:2 will be different 
from that given to it under Article III:4.75 Article III:2 imposes two different 
obligations in its two sentences under which ‘like products’ take on different 
interpretations.76 Although Article III:4 does not restate the principle of ‘so 
as not to afford protection to domestic production’, it is very crucial in its 
interpretation.77 As a result, imported and domestic products that are in a 
competitive relationship will be classified as ‘like products’ under Article 
III:4.78 In the analysis of whether Sections 10 and 12 violates Article III:4, it 
is difficult to conceive a circumstance where preference and priority will be 
73 Blacks’ Law Dictionary (8th edn, 2004) 900.
74 The decision of the Appellate Body in EC- Bananas III was that the EC’s requirement that 
a valid licence had to be held before permission can be given to import bananas from non 
traditional ACP suppliers was a violation of Article III:4. The measure was said to have 
given a competitive advantage to bananas produced locally.
75 EC - Asbestos (n 60) [94].
76 ibid [95]. The Appellate Body gave its reasons thus; “In construing Article III:4, the same 
interpretive consideration do not arise, because the ‘general principle’ articulated in Article 
III:1 is expressed in Article III:4, not through two distinct obligations, as in the two sentenc-
es in Article III:2, but instead through a single obligation that applies solely to like products. 
Therefore, the harmony that we have attributed to the two sentences in Article III:2 need 
not, and indeed, cannot be replicated in interpreting Article III:4. Thus, we conclude that, 
given the textual difference between Article II:” and Article III:4, the ‘accordion’ of likeness 
stretches in a different way in Article III:4”.
77 See Appellate Body Report, Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II (n 41) [111]; EC – Asbestos (n 
60) [98].
78 ibid, 99-100.
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given to a domestic product and there will not be an imported product that 
is in a competitive relationship.
Since the Act under review is relatively new, there has not been any legal 
challenge on its provisions just yet.79 This makes it difficult to pick out a 
single ‘like’ imported product that has been discriminated against as a result 
of the application of the provisions of the Act. In trying to answer this ques-
tion of likeness in relation to the Act under the circumstance, the approach 
will be hypothetical. If we take for instance a situation where Contractor X 
requires crane lifters for a particular project in Warri, Nigeria, he is faced 
with a choice of purchasing or hiring either locally produced crane lifters 
or an imported ‘like’. The dictates of the Act are, that preference should be 
given to the domestic crane. This immediately puts the imported crane at a 
competitive disadvantage.
In this hypothetical circumstance, it then becomes an issue whether the 
two products can be classified as ‘like products’. It will be recalled that in 
determining what will be seen as ‘like products’, we will consider the quali-
ties and nature of the products, consumers’ habits and tastes, the end uses of 
the product as well as the tariff classifications.80 In the light of this consider-
ation and the competitive relationship analysis above, it is safe to conclude 
that wherever it can be established that there are ‘like’ imported products 
available to compete with their domestic counterparts in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry, the requirements of the second test have been met.
Is The Treatment Less Favourable?
The less favourable treatment test does not imply that no distinction should be made between imported products and domestic ones. Rath-
er, it dictates that the distinction should not be such that accords a less 
favourable treatment to the imported product or puts it at a competitive 
disadvantage. Article III:4 has to be interpreted so as to ensure that there is 
‘effective equality of opportunities for imported products’.81 It is difficult to 
find a credible argument that will wriggle Sections 10 and 12 through the no 
less favourable treatment test. 
The provisions clearly give preference and priority to domestic prod-
ucts, which will always ensure that ‘like’ imported products come second in 
79 J Nwaokoro, ‘Beyond Legislation: A Contract Alternative to Legislating Local Content in 
Nigeria’ (2009)18 Currents Int’l Trade Law Journal 42.
80 Japan - Alcoholic Beverages (n 41).
81 US – Gasoline (n 72) [6.10]. See also, US - Malt Beverages (n 64) [5.30]; US - Section 337 
(n 63) [5.11].
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every circumstance. This measure obviously creates an inequality of oppor-
tunities against imported products. ‘Like’ domestic products enjoy an ad-
vantage under the Act. In providing that preference and priority should be 
given to Nigerian products, Sections 10 and 12 has not only made a distinc-
tion between domestic products and ‘like’ imported products, it has handed 
a competitive advantage to domestic products in the market. This amounts 
to discrimination based solely on the origin of the product. It amounts to a 
violation of Article III:1 and Article III:4 of the GATT. Also, since the Act 
does not make a distinction between products emanating from other mem-
ber countries and products emanating from non-member countries, the Sec-
tions can be said to be in violation of the obligations of the Nigerian nation 
under the GATT regime.
The Existence of a Contractual Alternative to Legislation
It is indeed possible for the Nigerian Authorities to implement a viable local content policy, which will achieve all the objectives of the Nigerian 
Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act and even more without the 
potential legal logjam that the new Act might create. Given that the Nige-
rian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is a juristic person in law,82 
an agreement it reaches with IOCs pursuant to the 1993 Model Production 
Sharing Contract should fall outside the purviews of the WTO/GATT re-
gime and therefore should not amount to a violation of the non-discrimina-
tion obligations of the Nigerian state in International Trade Law. It is con-
ceivable that the Nigerian Federal Government, through the NNPC, could 
mandate the contracting IOCs to give preference to Nigerian goods and 
services through the contractual vehicle of Production Sharing Contract. 
Such an arrangement will fall within the realm of private contracts between 
two competent ‘persons’ in law.83
Revisiting decided cases one is tempted to hold the position that Article 
III sets out to prevent discriminatory treatment of imported goods for the 
purpose of protecting local production where the measure or regulatory in-
82 See Section 1 of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, Chapter 320 LFN 
1990.  This Section establishes the ‘Corporation’ as a body corporate with the powers to 
hold and dispose of properties. Also, Section 6(c) empowers the Corporation to enter into 
any contract or partnership with any company, firm or person which will facilitate the dis-
charge of the Corporation’s duties under the Act.
83 See Section 38, Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2004, Chapter C20 LFN 2004. Under 
this Section, companies, as well as corporations in Nigeria are authorised to exercise the full 
powers ‘of a natural person of full capacity’.
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tervention complained of is direct.84 However, where the measure is indirect 
and subtle, protectionist policies may not be seen to have violated Article 
III.85 On the strength of this, the above-mentioned contractual arrangement 
might pass as an indirect and subtle regulatory intervention without breach-
ing the obligations of the Nigerian state under Article III.
5. CONCLUSION 
A vibrant local content policy is undoubtedly desirable for sustainable development and growth of the Nigerian oil and gas sector. Therefore, 
efforts made by Nigerian authorities towards actualising this objective are 
highly commendable. Given the huge investments made in the Nigerian oil 
and gas sector annually and the boundless prospects and potentials of the 
sector to create jobs and stimulate the Nigerian economy, the decision to en-
act a local content law becomes even more logical. However, key provisions 
of the Act flagrantly conflict with Nigeria’s obligations under international 
trade regime to proscribe discriminatory trade policies and to remove local 
barriers to foreign participation in trade. This paper is a wake up call on the 
need for a review and reform of the Act to bring it in line with Nigeria’s fair 
treatment and non-discrimination obligations under international trade law.
One key policy alternative is to indirectly regulate where and how IOCs 
procure materials to be used in the Nigerian oil and gas industry through 
contractual provisions. Contractual alternatives to legislation provide more 
practical and indirect alternative that must be explored. For example, the 
Nigerian 1993 Model Production Sharing Contract allows the NNPC to 
hold Oil Mining Lease (OML) in Nigeria while the IOCs work as contrac-
tors in a joint venture-like arrangement. There is however a clause in the 
contract that stipulates inter alia, how and where the contractor should 
obtain materials to be used in its operations. This stipulation mandates 
the contractor to make procurements locally where such is available and 
it meets industry standards. Again, the contractor is required to submit its 
work plan and budget to the joint venture management committee for ap-
proval periodically. The dominant role played by the NNPC on this com-
mittee ensures that it is in a position to exercise the power of veto over the 
proposals of the contractor where they fail to meet local content standards. 
84  Van den Bossche (n 8) 328.
85 See Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II (n 41) [109].
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This contractual approach, which will be based on already existing but 
unexplored legal framework contained in the 1993 Model Production Shar-
ing Contract, is strongly recommended. Such expansive contractual pro-
vision will achieve the aim of stimulating interest in locally made oil and 
gas equipment. At the same time, since contractual provisions are based 
on mutual agreements, contractual provisions will arguably not come un-
der the categorization of ‘laws, regulations and any other requirement’ that 
affect trade, which is the focus of Article III:4. This, observably, will place 
huge responsibilities on the shoulders of the NNPC and given the institu-
tional stability that the body enjoys as well as the fact that it is under the 
supervision of the Nigerian Presidency through the Minister of Petroleum 
Resources, the task is not insurmountable.
